Economic Perspective on Non-economic Phenomena

Tomáš Miklánek



EVROPSKÁ UNIE

Evropské strukturální a investiční fondy

Operační program Výzkum, vývoj a vzdělávání



Lecturer and TAs

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• Tomáš Miklánek (tomas.miklanek@vse.cz)

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- Teaching assistant:
 - Jméno a příjmení TA, email

- Lectures: den, hodiny, místnost
- Exercise sessions (occasional migration allowed upon agreement with TA):
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Semester schedule

Week (<i>Den v týdnu</i> date)	Торіс
Datum	Intro lecture
Datum	Family
Datum	Matching market
Datum	Marriage and Labor market
Datum	Fertility and Family policies
Datum	Exam (Midterm)
Datum	Drugs
Datum	Crime
Datum	Crime applications
Datum	Health
Datum	Religion
Datum	Discrimination
Datum	Final exam

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 - Midterm Exam 30%
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- Midterm (March 18th)
 - topics of Family Economics
 - mandatory
 - non-participation possible if supported by medical evidence (then it is written right after your final exam)
- Final exam
 - non-cumulative (no Family Economics)

Readings

- Hoffman and Averett (2010): Women and the economy: family, work, and pay
- Cooter and Ulen (2014): Law and Economics
- Smelser and Swedberg (1994): The Handbook of Economic Sociology (or newer versions)
- Becker and Becker (1997): The Economics of Life

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- Topic related readings will be announced with the topics

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- Enthusiasm
 - the most important

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- People maximize their welfare (not only monetary outcomes) and are rational given their decision-making framework

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 - You can improve both decisions by investing time and effort
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 - It is rational to be ignorant when information costs more than is worth (MC>MB)

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 - If he shoots and even takes time to aim, he increases probability to get shot.
 - Both, a general and a soldier want to win and both want the soldier to survive, but relative importance of the soldier's life is much greater for the soldier than for the general.

Individual rationality vs. Group outcome





Suppose that 1000 citizens of some town can

use either car or train to get to their workplace. Duration of the train trip is always 30 minutes. Time of the car trip is given (in minutes) by $T_c = 20 + \frac{N}{50}$. Where N is number of the drivers on the road. Time is the only cost in this example and there are no other costs.



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An observed outcome may not be the best for the society, however, it may be individually rational.



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- How can we conclusively derive cause-effect relationship?

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 - Use a simple economic models to describe the observed behavior
 - Examine the outcome of these situations for the individuals and society

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- Marginal benefit of the crime > marginal cost of the crime ⇒ It is rational to commit a crime

Think about this...

 Rape is a serious crime. However, the punishment for it, is in most countries significantly lower than for a murder. Could you think about the argument why is it so? Try to use the reasoning we have just discussed.

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- Rape is a serious crime. However, the punishment for it, is in most countries significantly lower than for a murder. Could you think about the argument why is it so? Try to use the reasoning we have just discussed.
- More about Economics of Crime in April

Economic model A simplified theoretical construct illustrating economic processes and relationships between them using mathematical tools

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- Why we need economic models?
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- Problems with economic models?
 - Short articles about use of the models: LINK1, LINK2

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D(O) = Damages of crime (as function of offenses) C(O,p) = Costs of apprehension (as function of offenses and probability of apprehension)Expected penalty cost = *bpfO* where *b* translates into social costs of penalty ($b \approx 0$ for fines)

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Matching problems

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- Assignment of the students into dormitory rooms


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- Life partner choice is such example.People have their own preferences over potential partners and it is usually not possible that everybody gets his/her most preferred choice.
- There may be a socially optimal outcome, but we need to talk more about the algorithms for how to achieve this outcome.
- Importantly: such outcomes cannot be forced upon people in a centralized way.

• Unless you are religious, perhaps...



• More about matching markets in 2 weeks...

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- How to choose the best regime for each drug?

What would happen if we prolong education time?

Countries with high levels of educational attainment tend to have larger shares of religiously unaffiliated adults than countries with low attainment

Share of adults ages 25 and older with no religious affiliation us. average years of schooling for all adults



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Correlation/Causality?

For the next lecture...

• Malthusian theory: that fertility would rise and fall as incomes increased and decreased.

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- Contradicted by data:



Source: CIA World Factbook (2015)

Think about this...

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- What may be the reasons for having less children in a more developed societies?
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- Suggested reading for today:
 - THE ECONOMIC WAY OF LOOKING AT LIFE, Gary S. Becker, Economic Sciences, 1992 (Nobel Prize Lecture)



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Národohospodářská fakulta VŠE v Praze



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