Behavioral Finance

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EVROPSKÁ UNIE Evropské strukturální a investiční fondy Operační program Výzkum, vývoj a vzdělávání



Behavioral Finance – aim of the course

- To reunite the fields of psychology and finance
- To shed light on major concepts of behavioral approach such as cognitive biases, individual emotions and other psychological effects
- To give a **new perspective to market inefficiencies**, apply psychologically realistic assumptions and analyze effects of these assumptions

Learning outcomes and competences

- ✓ Ability to explain why market participants make irrational systematic errors contrary to assumption of rational market participants
- ✓ Knowledge of how other participants take advantage of such errors and market inefficiencies
- ✓ Mastering how to test market behaviour in an experimental laboratory

Outline of the course

Date	Course contents:	
20.9.	1. Introduction to Behavioral Finance	
27.9.	2. Dean holiday	
	 Psychology of decision making in practice (guest speaker) Limits to arbitrage, aggregate stock market and market anomalies I - Equity premium puzzle and volatility puzzle 	
18.10.	5. Market anomalies II and Investor behavior	
25.10.	6. Trading and trading strategies in practice (guest speaker)	
1.11.	7. Market bubbles+Laboratory experiment I	
8.11.	8. Laboratory experiment II	
15.11.	9. Agent-Based Computational Finance (guest speaker)	
22.11.	10. Behavioral corporate finance	
29.11.	11. Valuation theory, economic policy (guest speaker)	
6.12.	12. Presentations and wrap up	
13.12.	13. Exam	

Course requirements

- Laboratory experiment attendance 20 points (+ up to 5 bonus points based on the results)
- Paper presentation 25 points
- Final exam 55 points

(at least 50 % of final exam to pass the course)

Total – 100 points

Course literature

Major:

 ARBERIS, Nicholas C., and Richard H. THALER, 2003. <u>A survey of behavioral finance</u>. In: George M. CONSTANTINIDES, Milton HARRIS, and René M. STULZ, eds. Handbook of the Economics of Finance: Volume 1B, Financial Markets and Asset Pricing. Elsevier North Holland, Chapter 18, pp. 1053–1128.

Other (i.e. examples for presentations):

- BRUNNERMEIER AND NAGEL: Hedge Funds and the Technology Bubble
- BARBER AND ODEAN: Boys will be boys: Gender, overconfidence and common stock investment
- De BONDT, Werner F. M., and Richard THALER, 1985. Does the stock market overreact? The Journal of Finance, 40(3), 793–805.
- EDMANS, GARCIA, and NORLI (2007): Sports Sentiment and Stock Returns
- FAMA, Eugene F., 1998. Market efficiency, long-term returns, and behavioral finance. Journal of Financial Economics, 49(3), 283–306.
- GAOFENG ZOU et al (2017): Investor Sentiment and IPOs Anomalies: An Agent-Based Computational Finance
- KAHNEMAN, Daniel, and Amos TVERSKY, 1979. Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica, 47(2), 263–292.
- KAHNEMAN, Daniel, and Amos TVERSKY, 2000. Choices, Values, and Frames. Cambridge University Press.
- NARASIMHAN JEGADEESH and SHERIDAN TITMAN: <u>Returns to Buying Winners and Selling Losers: Implications for Stock Market Efficiency</u>
- SMITH, SUCHANEK, WILLIAMS: <u>Bubbles, Crashes, and Endogenous Expectations in Experimental Spot Asset Markets</u>
- SEWEL, Martin, 2007, <u>Behavioral Finance</u>, University College London, accessed from <u>web here</u>
- THALER (1999): Mental accounting matters
- TVERSKY, Amos, and Daniel KAHNEMAN, 1974. <u>Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases</u>. Science, 185(4157), 1124–1131.
- TVERSKY, Amos, and Daniel KAHNEMAN, 1981. <u>The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice</u>. Science, 211(4481), 453–458.
- TVERSKY, Amos, and Daniel KAHNEMAN, 1983. Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: the conjunction fallacy in probability judgment. Psychol. Rev. 90, 4. doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.90.4.293
- TVERSKY, Amos, and Daniel KAHNEMAN, 1992. <u>Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty</u>. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 5(4), 297–323.

The need to understand inefficiencies and biases

WHY THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH IS NOT EXPLAINING IT ALL

TRADITIONAL FRAMEWORK

Efficient Market Hypothesis

Assets' prices fully reflect all available information, trading at their fundamental value – no "free lunch"

Rational Expectations Hypothesis:

When receiving new information, agents update their beliefs correctly (Bayes' law) and make choices that are normatively acceptable, consistent with Savage's notion of Subjective Expected Utility (SEU).*

= agents' expectation can be wrong, but they are correct on average over time, there are no biases

In reality there are evidences of irrationality, inconsistency and errors in judgement that traditional framework can't explain

^{*} For reference see Course literature, Arberis and Thaler (2003), A Survey of Behavioral Finance, p. 1053

CRITICISM TO TRADITIONAL FRAMEWORK

- The assumption that economic agents have unlimited processing capabilities turned out as unrealistic
 - => idea of **bounded rationality** (Herbert Simon)
 - cognitive resources of individuals such as time, memory or attention, plus the information available, are in reality limited and create source of judgement and decision biases
 - describes more realistic approach to cover human problem solving competences
- To adopt strategies to correct mispricing can be in reality costly
- = > Two key building stones of Behavioral Finance:
- I. Psychology
- II. Limits to arbitrage

Behavioral Finance

- More "realistic" approach to financial markets and its participants
- Considers influence of psychology on the behavior of financial practitioners and the subsequent effect on markets.*
- Helps explain revealed irrationalities and biases
- Gained importance especially after financial crisis (dot-com bubble to mortgage crisis)

^{*} For reference see Course literature, Sewell (2007), Behavioral Finance, p. 1

EXAMPLES OF IRRATIONAL DECISION MAKING

• Ultimatum game*

(Imagine I give you 1000 CZK. One in pairs offers his/her colleague any amount, willing to give away. If your colleague accepts, he/she can keep the offered amount and you can keep the rest. If your colleague refuses the offer, none of you gets anything)

How did you do?

- Ultimatum game when carried out between members of a shared social group:
 - o people offer fair splits (50:50) and
 - o offers of less than 30% are often rejected.

IS IT RATIONAL?

OTHER EXAMPLES

Amazon gift certificate

Would you prefer \$100 certificate for free or 150\$ certificate for 30\$?

Economist subscription – the importance of irrelevant alternatives

	3 options (A,B,C)	2 options (A,C)
A. Web subscription (\$59.00)	16 %	68 %
B. Print subscription (\$125.00)	o %	-
C. Web and print subscription (\$125.00)	84 %	32 %

• Linda*

Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations.


- A) Linda is a bank teller
- B) Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement


^{*} For reference see Course literature, Tversky and Kahneman (1983), Extensional versus intuitive reasoning

Coming next:

 Psychology of Decision making (specific types of cognitive biases)

Limits to Arbitrage discussion







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